The most scandalous errors of U.S. intelligence in the struggle against the USSR

© AFP 2017 / Saul LoebШтаб-apartment of the CIA in Langley, VirginiaThe most scandalous errors of U.S. intelligence in the struggle against the USSR© AFP 2017 / Saul LoebВладимир Ardev, a columnist for RIA Novosti

The fight against the «Soviet threat» was the main task of the Central intelligence Agency created 18 September 1947. And just then the Americans made a lot of mistakes. The CIA could not «guess» when the Union will have the atomic bomb, failed to predict the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to assess the economic potential of the Soviet state. The most secret US agents of Soviet special services were recruited by: Americans are too fond of money, alcohol and women. About the most high-profile failures of the CIA in the material RIA Novosti.

«Report with the same conclusions was circulated and August 24, 1949, just five days before the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb,» reads the official website of American intelligence.

In the estimates of the Soviet nuclear program, the CIA actually made a lot of mistakes. So, for example, management miscalculated the availability in the USSR deposits of high-grade uranium ore.

During the whole period of confrontation between the USA and the USSR, the CIA competed with the Pentagon to assess military threat from the Soviet Union. The most serious opponent of intelligence was military analyst Andrew Marshall, for 42 years head of the office of the General analysis of the Ministry of defense.

Marshall claimed that, in assessing the military power of the USSR, the CIA does a very superficial analysis. The Marshall was joined by well-known economist, Soviet dissident Igor Birman, who argued that their conclusions exploration builds on unreliable data.

«The CIA used in the analysis of official Soviet information — the figures from the reference of the state statistics Committee and the state planning Commission, often nothing to do with reality did not have. This was done with the sole purpose to show that from the Soviet Union presents a serious threat to US security, to «knock out» a solid budget», — said Igor Birman.

As a result, Soviet military spending during the cold war, was estimated by the CIA in 55-60% of GDP, while analysts Marshall had been estimated at 25-30% of GDP, which was much closer to the truth.

By the end of the 70s the situation has been fundamentally different, however, the CIA in its reports continued to overestimate the power of the Soviet potential. Even when, in 1989 fell the Berlin wall many in the West began to doubt the viability of the Soviet Union, the Central intelligence Agency continued to insist that what is happening does not affect the stability in the USSR and the consistency of its policy.

Speaking in may 1992, the members of the foreign policy Association in new York, former CIA Director Robert gates acknowledged that until the collapse of the Union, analysts of management «underestimated the opportunity.» This intelligence failure was so shattering that the Congress raised the issue of «full reform».